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AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE ROLE OF THE 




An en banc Federal Circuit recently confirmed that § 112 of the Patent 
Act,1 as properly interpreted, includes a written description requirement that 
is separate and distinct from the enablement requirement.2  The written de-
scription and enablement doctrines both encourage applicants to fully dis-
close their inventions, but the doctrines respectively focus on proof that the 
patentee (1) has possession of the invention;3 and (2) has enabled others to 
make and use the invention.4  The en banc-challenger argued instead that 
the patent statute spells out a unified requirement of a written description 
that enables and that the separate written description requirement should be 
eliminated.5 
The U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO) is the executive branch 
agency tasked with the responsibility of examining patent applications to 
determine whether patent rights should issue.6  Once a patent issues, the 





  Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri School of Law, crouchdd@missouri.edu.  Au-
thor of Patent Law Blog (Patently-O), http://www.patentlyo.com (link).  I want to thank the Colloquy 
editors for their excellent and timely editorial suggestions. 
1
  35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (2006) (link). 
2
  Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (link).  The Federal Cir-
cuit‘s pronouncements on patent law are especially important because that court holds exclusive juris-
diction over all appeals of final decisions for cases that arise under the US patent laws.  Holmes Group, 
Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 82930 (2002) (link). 
3
  Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (asking whether the application 
―reasonably convey[s] to one of skill in the art that the inventor possessed the [claimed] subject matter at 
the time the [patent] application was filed‖ (citation omitted)) (link). 
4
  AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1243–44 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (the original specification of a 
patent must enable one of skill in the art to make and use the invention) (link). 
5
  Brief for Plaintiffs-Apellees, Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 
22, 2010). 
6
  See generally JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 4558 (3rd ed. 2009) (providing an overview of 
the patent examination process). 
7
  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (giving Congress the power to ―promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respec-
tive Writings and Discoveries‖) (link). 
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courts.8  Although the USPTO has no direct role in the infringement dispute 
between the patentee Ariad9 and the accused infringer Eli Lilly,10 the gov-
ernment submitted an amicus curiae brief indicating its continued support 
for the written description requirement as a tool that the USPTO uses to 
eliminate claims during the patent examination process.11  The government 
argued in its brief that a separate written description requirement is ―neces-
sary to permit USPTO to perform its basic examination function.‖12  How-
ever, when pressed during oral arguments, the government could not point 
to any direct evidence supporting its contention.13 
This Essay presents the results of a retrospective empirical study of the 
role of the written description requirement in patent office examination 
practice.  It is narrowly focused on rebutting the USPTO‘s claim that the 
separate written description requirement serves an important role in the pa-
tent prosecution process.  To the contrary, my results support the conclusion 
that it is indeed ―exceedingly rare that the patent office hangs its case on 
written description.‖14 
For the study, I analyzed 2,858 Board of Patent Appeals and Interfe-
rence (BPAI) patent opinions decided between January and June of 2009.  
Written description issues were decided in 123 (4.3%) of the decisions in 
my sample.  Perhaps surprisingly, I found that none of the outcomes of 
those decisions would have been impacted by a legal change that entirely 
eliminated the written description requirement of § 112, so long as the 
USPTO would still be allowed to reject claims based on the addition of 





  28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2006) (―The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action 
arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents . . . .‖) (link). 
9
  Ariad‘s U.S. Patent No. 6,410,516 entitled ―Nuclear Factors Associated with Transcriptional Reg-
ulation‖ includes over 200 claims that broadly cover methods for reducing the activity of the naturally 
occurring Nuclear Factor Kappa B (NF-κB) protein.  The patent is jointly owned by Harvard College, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the Whitehead Institute, and exclusively licensed by Ariad.  
U.S. Patent No. 6,410,516 (filed June 5, 1995) (link). 
10
  Eli Lilly has a history of involvement in disputes over the written description requirement.  It was 
the 1997 Federal Circuit decision of Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1569 
(Fed. Cir. 1997), that sparked what many have seen as a heightened written description requirement for 
biotechnology related inventions (link). 
11
  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Rehearing en banc in Support of Respondent, 
Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (link). 
12
  Id. at 20. 
13
  See Oral Argument, Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (ar-
gued Dec. 7, 2009), available at http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov (enter case number 2008-1248; 
click audio link for 12-7-2009; oral argument from the United States on the issue runs 23:0029:30) 
(link). 
14
  Id. (Statement by Michel, C.J., as transcribed by the author), available at 
http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov. (enter case number 2008-1248; click audio link for 12-7-2009; 
statement from Michel, C.J. at 24:08) (link). 
15
  This very small number of positive observations suggests that the distribution is well modeled 
with the Poisson distribution.  Using a Poisson distribution, the 95% confidence interval for expected 
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prohibited the USPTO from making new matter rejections would alter the 
result in only twenty of the 2,858 cases—about 1% of the cases in my sam-
ple.16  These results correspond to the outcomes found by Professor Holman 
in his 2007 article, Is Lilly Written Description a Paper Tiger?: A Compre-
hensive Assessment of the Impact of Eli Lilly and its Progeny in the Courts 
and PTO.17  In that article, Holman identified nine examples where original 
claims were rejected for lacking written description.18  However, Holman 
wrote that each of those rejected claims was, or ―could have easily been,‖ 
held invalid for lacking enablement.19 
In Ariad Pharmaceuticals v. Eli Lilly, the Federal Circuit maintained 
the written description doctrine as a separate and distinct requirement.20  
The en banc panel based its decision on the text of the Patent Act and its ac-
companying jurisprudential history, rather than on the policy grounds that 
the doctrine plays an important role in policing patent applicant behavior.21  
The dissenting-in-part opinion by Judge Linn, joined by Judge Rader, as 
well as the concurring opinion of Judge Gajarsa, cite a working version of 
this Article in reaching their conclusions that the separate written descrip-
tion requirement is not justified on policy grounds.22  As shown in this es-
say, the empirical data confirms the court‘s rejection of the doctrine‘s 
importance. 
This Essay is narrowly written to provide a new set of empirical results 
that inform the debate over the importance of the written description in the 
context of patent prosecution.  The strong conclusion is that, in the context 
of patent applications appealed to the BPAI, the impact of the separate writ-
ten description requirement is negligible apart from its role in policing the 
addition of new matter.  I posit that this study of BPAI decisions also serves 
as a good proxy for the relative proportion of non-appealed cases where the 
USPTO depends upon the written description requirement to limit claim 
scope.  The analysis does, however, have limits.  Perhaps most importantly, 
I only consider past decisions within a six-month window and thus do not 
consider the future effect of a change in the written description requirement 
on both applicant and patent office behavior. 
These results are important as a direct rebuttal to the USPTO claims of 
                                                                                                                           
proportion of affected cases is 0.0%–0.6%. 
16
  The empirical study has a 95% confidence interval of 0.5%–2.6%. 
17
  Christopher M. Holman, Is Lilly Written Description a Paper Tiger?: A Comprehensive Assess-
ment of the Impact of Eli Lilly and its Progeny in the Courts and PTO, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 70 
(2007). 
18
  Id. 
19
  Id. at 71. 
20
  598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (link). 
21
  Id. at 134345. 
22
  Id. at 1372 (Linn, J. & Rader, J., dissenting in part); id. at 1360 (Gajarsa, J., concurring); see also 
Anascape, Ltd. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., No. 2008-1500, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7529, at *2327 (Fed. 
Cir. Apr. 13, 2010) (Gajarsa, J., concurring). 
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doctrinal importance and as a means to lessen fears that elimination of a 
separate written description requirement would have a drastic impact on the 
patent prosecution practice.23  More generally, the results prompt a consid-
eration of the ongoing role of niche patent law doctrines. 
Part I of this Essay offers a brief discussion of § 112‘s requirements for 
written description.  Part II examines the Ariad challenge to the written de-
scription requirement presented on appeal.  Part III explores the USPTO‘s 
claimed need for a strong and separate written description requirement to 
aid in the patent examination process.  Part IV presents the empirical study 
and its results.  Part V provides a brief set of final remarks and conclusions. 
I. THE WRITTEN DESCRIPTION REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 112 
The first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 focuses attention on the amount 
of disclosure that a patent applicant must provide in its specification: 
 
The specification shall contain a written description of the 
invention, and of the manner and process of making and us-
ing it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to en-
able any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or 
with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the 
same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the 




From this paragraph, courts have derived three separate but overlap-
ping doctrines: written description, enablement, and best mode.25  These 
doctrines have been amply described by others and, as such, I provide only 
as much background here as is necessary for this Essay.26 
As it stands, the written description doctrine requires that the patent 
specification ―reasonably convey to one of skill in the art that the inventor 
possessed the [claimed] subject matter at the time the [patent] application 
was filed.‖27  Patent applicants often add or amend claims during prosecu-





  See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 42930 (2000) (refusing to overrule Miranda 
based largely on the ―persuasive force‖ of stare decisis) (link). 
24
  35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (2006) (link). 
25
  See Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123 (2006).  This Essay 
focuses on the enablement and written description doctrines, without regard to the best mode doctrine. 
26
  See, e.g., DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 7 (2009); Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Dis-
closure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539 (2009) (link); Holbrook, supra note 25; Holman, supra note 17; Sean A. 
Passino, Amy M. Rocklin & Stephen B. Maebius, Written Description Traps for Antibody Claims, 86 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC‘Y 317 (2004); Guang Ming Whitley, A Patent Doctrine Without Bounds: 
The “Extended” Written Description Requirement, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 617 (2004). 
27
  Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (considering whether later-claimed 
subject matter had been properly disclosed in the parent application) (citation omitted) (link). 
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has been to police the addition of ―new matter‖ into the patent claims.28  
Section 132 of the Patent Act also provides a prohibition against ―intro-
duc[ing] new matter into the disclosure of the invention.‖29  Because the 
claims of a patent are considered part of the disclosure,30 the plain language 
of § 132 could also apply to limit changes in claim scope.  However, in an 
effort to avoid confusion between these two statutory provisions, the prede-
cessor to the Federal Circuit held that the written description requirement of 
§ 112 served as ―the proper basis for rejection of a claim amended to recite 
elements thought to be without support in the original disclosure‖ and rele-
gated § 132 to the role of policing improper amendments to the specifica-
tion.31 
Originally-filed patent claims are typically self-describing.  Patent 
claims ordinarily exhibit the requisite evidence of ―possession‖ by simply 
spelling out the metes and bounds of the patent right.  However, several re-
cent Federal Circuit opinions have held that originally-filed patent claims 
also lack sufficient written description if possession of the invention is not 
demonstrated.32  This newer wing of the written description requirement is 
often termed Lilly Written Description (LWD), as homage to the 1997 Eli 





  See id.; see also In re Rasmussen, 650 F.2d 1212 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (link); Application of Smith, 
458 F.2d 1389, 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1972) (a subgenus is not necessarily described by a genus encompassing 
it and a species upon which it reads); Application of Lukach, 442 F.2d 967 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (subgenus 
range was not supported by generic disclosure and specific example within the subgenus range) (link); 
Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV 
1619, 1663 (2007) (written description requirement ―has traditionally applied to amendments to claims 
made during the prosecution of an application.‖ (citation omitted)) (link). 
29
  35 U.S.C. § 132 (2006) (link). 
30
  Application of Gardner, 480 F.2d 879, 879 (C.C.P.A. 1973). 
31
  In re Rasmussen, 650 F.2d at 1214.  This Essay focuses on the role of the written description in 
patent office practice.  However, it is important to note the open question of whether the new matter re-
striction of § 132 properly serves as a basis in federal court for an invalidity defense to charges of patent 
infringement.  See Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 375 F.3d 1303, 130507 (Fed. Cir. 
2004) (Lourie, J., concurring) (denying motion for en banc rehearing and noting that the listing of statu-
tory defenses to patent infringement found in 35 U.S.C. § 282 does not include the new matter doctrine 
of § 132) (link); Aristocrat Techs. Austl. PTY Ltd. v. Int‘l Game Tech., 543 F.3d 657, 659 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (finding that improper revival is not an available defense) (link); Dennis Crouch, Erroneous Re-
vival by PTO is not a Cognizable Defense in an Infringement Action, PATENTLY-O, Sept. 22, 2008, 
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2008/09/erroneous-reviv.html (link). 
32
  See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 156768 (Fed. Cir. 
1997) (link); see generally Janice M. Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written Description Re-
quirement to Biotechnological Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 615 (1998) (describing the develop-
ment of the written description requirement); U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Manual of Patent 
Examining Procedure § 2163 (8th ed., July 2008) (―a lack of adequate written description may arise 
even for an original claim when an aspect of the claimed invention has not been described with suffi-
cient particularity such that one skilled in the art would recognize that the applicant had possession of 
the claimed invention.‖) (link).  It is important to remember that the originally-filed claims are them-
selves part of the original specification.  N. Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931, 938 (Fed. 
Cir. 1990) (link). 
33
  Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (link). 
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found where the invention is claimed and described in a functional form 
without identifying underlying structures of operation.  Likewise, broad 
original claims have been held invalid for failing the written description re-
quirement when the specification did not include detail sufficient to ―con-
vince a person of skill in the art that the inventor possessed the invention.‖35  
For instance, the 2005 LizardTech case involved a patent claim directed to a 
method of compressing digital images using seamless discrete wave trans-
formation (DWT).36  Although the specification only described one method 
for creating a seamless DWT, the claim was not limited to that particular 
method.37  The appellate panel in LizardTech held the claim invalid for fail-
ing the written description requirement, finding that the specification did 
not provide sufficient evidence that the patentee invented the generic me-
thod.38 
As is common, the LizardTech decision included a parallel finding that 
the generic claim was not enabled.39  The enablement doctrine requires that 
the original specification of a patent enable one of skill in the art to make 
and use the invention.40  Although typically overlapping, the written de-
scription and enablement requirements are distinct.41 
II. THE ARIAD CHALLENGE TO THE WRITTEN DESCRIPTION 
REQUIREMENT 
A. Questions on Appeal  
In Ariad, an en banc Federal Circuit considered the continued role of 
the written description requirement as a doctrine separate and distinct from 
enablement.  The questions presented read as follows: 
 
1. Whether 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 1, contains a written 
description requirement separate from an enablement re-
quirement? 
2. If a separate written description requirement is set forth 
                                                                                                                           
34
  Holman, supra note 17, at 4; see Mueller, supra note 32, at 633 (arguing that written description 
as applied to original claims is an inappropriate ―super-enablement‖ requirement). 
35
  LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 134445 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (link). 
36
  Id. at 1337. 
37
  Id. at 134243. 
38
  Id. at 134546. 
39
  Id. at 1345.  See also Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 F.3d 1366, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(holding that the enablement question was moot because claims were rendered invalid for failing the 
written description requirement) (link); Holman, supra note 17, at 78; Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, 
Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157, 1172 (2002) (link). 
40
  35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (2006) (link); AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1238 (Fed. Cir. 
2003) (link); Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1327 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
41
  Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 358 F.3d 916, 921 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (although 
―there is often significant overlap,‖ the requirements are distinct) (link). 
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in the statute, what is the scope and purpose of the require-
ment?42 
 
These legal questions had been brewing for years.43 
B. Background of the Dispute 
The inventors of Ariad‘s asserted U.S. Patent No. 6,410,516 (the ‗516 
patent) discovered a transcription factor protein that they named Nuclear 
Factor Kappa B (NF-κB).44  The presence of NF-κB within a cell causes the 
cell to produce cytokines that are important for a cell‘s immune response.45  
The ‗516 patent does not claim invention of the NF-κB protein itself, but ra-
ther, the method of reducing a cell‘s response to external influences by re-
ducing the NF-κB binding.46 
After an infringement trial, a Massachusetts jury found that two of Lil-
ly‘s products infringed Ariad‘s asserted U.S. Patent No. 6,410,516.47  The 
jury also rejected Lilly‘s arguments that the patent was anticipated, that the 
patent lacked an enabling disclosure, and that the patent failed the written 
description requirement.48  Although Lilly appealed each of these issues, the 
Federal Circuit panel focused on the written description requirement, find-
ing Ariad‘s claims invalid for failing to provide a written description of the 
invention.49 
The heart of the Ariad written description problem centers around the 
fact that the ‗516 patent discloses no working or even prophetic examples 
of methods that reduce NF-κB activity, and no completed syntheses of any 
of the molecules prophesized to be capable of reducing NF-κB activity.  
The state of the art at the time of filing was primitive and uncertain, leaving 
Ariad with an insufficient supply of prior art knowledge with which to fill 
the gaping holes in its disclosure.50 
The appellate panel refused to consider the parallel questions of 





  Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 595 F.3d 1329, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc order) 
(link). 
43
  See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 97075 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (denying en 
banc rehearing) (link); Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1303, 130304 (Fed. Cir. 
2004) (denying en banc rehearing) (link); LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, 433 F.3d 1373, 
137476 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (denying en banc rehearing) (link); Holman, supra note 17. 
44
  Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 F.3d 1366, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (link). 
45
  Id. at 1370. 
46
  Id. 
47
  Id. 
48
  Id. at 137071. 
49
  Id. at 137377 (holding that the verdict lacked substantial evidence to support its conclusion).  
The court also rejected Lilly‘s inequitable conduct challenge.  Id. at 137780. 
50
  Id. at 1376 (citation omitted). 
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description invalidity holding.51  Judge Linn wrote a separate concurring 
opinion in which he reiterated his belief that the court‘s ―engrafting of a 
separate written description requirement onto section 112, paragraph 1 is 
misguided.‖52 
The Federal Circuit subsequently granted Ariad‘s motion for an en 
banc rehearing of the written description issue.53  Over twenty-five amici 
filed briefs, including the U.S. government.54  At the December 7, 2009 oral 
arguments, the U.S. government was also granted time to argue its posi-
tion.55 
III. THE USPTO‘S CLAIM OF A NEED FOR THE WRITTEN DESCRIPTION 
REQUIREMENT 
In its amicus curiae brief, the U.S. government indicated its continued 
support for a separate written description requirement as a tool that the 
agency uses to eliminate claims during patent prosecutions.56  The govern-
ment made its position clear: that a separate written description requirement 
is ―essential to the operation of the patent system‖;57 plays an ―indispensa-
ble role in the administration of the patent system‖;58 is ―fundamental to the 
operation of the patent system‖;59 and is ―necessary for USPTO to perform 
its examination function.‖60  These conclusions are grounded in the 
USPTO‘s ―practical experience‖ in ―appl[ying] the requirements of Section 
112, ¶1 to more than 400,000 patent applications each year . . . .‖61  Al-
though the government did not provide any actual examples, it did explain 
two situations where the written description requirement becomes impor-





  Id. at 1380 (―Because we hold that claims 80, 95, 144, and 145 of the ′516 patent are invalid for 
lack of written description, we need not address infringement or the other validity issues on appeal.‖). 
52
  Id. (citation omitted) (Linn, J., concurring); see also Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 
Inc., 375 F.3d 1303, 132527 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Linn, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) 
(link); Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 98789 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Linn, J., dissent-
ing from denial of rehearing en banc) (link). 
53
  Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 595 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (link). 
54
  See Briefs for Amici Curiae, Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 
2010). 
55
  Oral Argument, Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (argued 
Dec. 7, 2009), available at http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov (enter case number 2008-1248; click 
audio link for 12-7-2009) (link). 
56
  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Rehearing en banc in Support of Respondent, 
Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (link). 
57
  Id. at 19. 
58
  Id. 
59
  Id. at 20. 
60
  Id. 
61
  Id. at 19. 
62
  Id. at 2325.  Similar arguments are raised in the USPTO‘s Guidelines for Examination of Patent 
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tional terms, the USPTO is better able to judge written description than 
enablement: 
 
Though such [functional] claims may be enabled, USPTO 
is not an experimental laboratory: it lacks both the facilities 
and the statutory mandate to determine, through empirical 
testing, whether any of millions of prior art inventions may 
have exhibited the recited function.  By insisting that each 
applicant provide a full and exact ―written description of 
the invention‖ as part of the specification, Congress pro-
tected the ability of USPTO to perform its essential func-
tion of distinguishing patentable inventions from the prior 
art.  Indeed, this is one of the original and enduring purpos-
es of the written description requirement: to ―distinguish 
the invention or discovery from other things before known 
and used.‖63  
 
The government also argued that the written description requirement is 
necessary to police priority claims and ensure that patent applicants do not 
improperly add new matter during the prosecution process: 
 
The written-description requirement permits USPTO and 
the courts to resolve priority disputes in an expedient and 
judicially reviewable fashion by comparing the specifica-
tions of the patents or applications in question.  Similarly, 
―[e]very patent system must have some provision to pre-
vent applicants from using the amendment process to up-
date their disclosures (claims or specifications) during their 
pendency before the patent office.‖  Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. 
Gen-Probe, Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 977 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Rad-
er, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing); see 35 U.S.C. 
§ 132.  ―Adequate description of the invention guards 
against the inventor‘s overreaching by insisting that he re-
count his invention in such detail that his future claims can 
be determined to be encompassed within his original crea-
                                                                                                                           
Applications Under the 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1, ―Written Description‖ Requirement, 66 Fed. Reg. 1099 
(notice on Jan. 5, 2001) (link).  See also Brief of the Washington Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Defendant-Appellant Supporting Reversal at 22, Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 
F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (a purpose of the written description requirement is to ―prevent applicants . . 
. from obtaining claims to inventions that they did not invent‖) (link); Brief of the Federal Circuit Bar 
Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant at 2223, Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 
598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (―A separate written description requirement is an important tool to 
permit the Patent Office and courts to enforce this foundational principle.‖) (link). 
63
  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Rehearing en banc in Support of Respondent at 
21, Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Act of 1790, ch. 7, 
§ 2) (link). 
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tion.‖  Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1561 
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (citation omitted).64 
 
During oral arguments, the court pressed the government attorney, Mr. 
Freeman, for specific evidence supporting the contention that the separate 
written description requirement serves a practical purpose.  As in its brief, 
the government did not point to any evidence supporting the conclusory 
statements.  The following colloquy at oral arguments between Chief Judge 
Michel and Mr. Freeman emphasized this point: 
 
Chief Judge Michel: Why does the patent office care?  I 
mean, how many applications that can‘t be rejected on oth-
er statutory grounds will fail only if we [retain the current 
written description requirement]? . . . I‘m asking about im-
pact . . . 
 
Mr. Freeman on Behalf of the Government: I don‘t know 
an absolute number, your Honor, but I think that number 
must be high . . .  
 
Chief Judge Michel: I can‘t remember ever seeing a patent 
office rejection that was based only on the failure of written 
description.  I‘m not saying there aren‘t any, but the flow of 
cases that come through this court at three or four hundred 
a year, it‘s exceedingly rare that the patent office hangs its 
case on written description.  I can‘t remember a single case. 
 
Mr. Freeman: Your Honor, I don‘t have a single case in 
mind . . . 
 
Chief Judge Michel: . . . [I]t seems like the practical impact 
is miniscule, negligible. 
 
Mr. Freeman: Your Honor, with all respect, one cannot as-
sume away four-hundred thousand applications where the 
written description doctrine comes into play in a great 






  Id. at 22. 
65
  Oral Argument, Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (argued 
Dec. 7, 2009), available at http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov (enter case number 2008-1248; click 
audio link for 12-7-2009; colloquy is from 22:4024:30) (excerpt reproduced as transcribed by the au-
thor) (link). 
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This Essay is directed to the particular questions of Chief Judge Mi-
chel—How often does the separate written description requirement actually 
make a difference in patent cases?  As revealed in Part IV, Chief Judge Mi-
chel‘s notional recollections from the bench are far more accurate than the 
government‘s contentions. 
IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE WRITTEN DESCRIPTION REQUIREMENT 
IN PATENT PROSECUTION 
This study analyzes the comparative impact that a change in the written 
description requirement would have had on ex parte BPAI appeals decided 
in the first half of 2009.  I posit two potential doctrinal changes and their 
impact on USPTO practice: (1) elimination of a separate written description 
requirement, including elimination of the USPTO‘s ability to reject claims 
that include ―new matter‖;66 and (2) elimination of a separate written de-
scription requirement, with the exception that the USPTO may still reject 
claims for the inclusion of new matter.67 
To be clear, Ariad has not argued for complete elimination of the writ-
ten description requirement.  Rather, the petitioner‘s position is that written 
description and enablement form a combined resulting doctrine that would 
have more power than the current enablement doctrine.68  For this study, 
however, we did not consider a strengthened enablement doctrine.  Thus, 
our results overstate the impact of eliminating a separate written description 
requirement, since a strengthened enablement doctrine would limit that im-
pact. 
A. Study Design 
I broadly searched 2,858 ex parte BPAI decisions that were decided 
January through June 2009, and identified 365 decisions that mention ―writ-





  I expect this potential outcome (eliminating the USPTO‘s ability to issue new matter rejections) 
to be unlikely for several reasons.  Most notably, elimination of the separate written description re-
quirement as a mechanism for policing new matter would abrogate In re Rasmussen, 650 F.2d 1212, 
1214 (C.C.P.A. 1976) and, at least, open the door for the USPTO to reject claims under the new matter 
prohibitions of 35 U.S.C. § 132.  The Rasmussen opinion was premised on the notion that Section 112 
includes a written description requirement.  See 650 F.2d at 1214.  Elimination of the written description 
requirement would likewise eliminate the justification for precedential value of Rasmussen.  More recent 
Federal Circuit case law has already strained the Rasmussen holding by considering claims to be proper-
ly rejected under Section 132.  In Moba B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc, 325 F.3d 1306, 1319 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003), for instance, the Federal Circuit explained that, ―a rejection of an amended claim under Sec-
tion 132 is equivalent to a rejection under Section 112, first paragraph.‖ (citation omitted) (link).  Never-
theless, because this point is apparently in serious dispute, I consider it as a potential doctrinal change. 
67
  Other potential outcomes, such as a strengthening of the written description requirement, were 
excluded. 
68
  Brief for Plaintiffs-Apellees, Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 
2010). 
69
  These represented all of the ex parte BPAI decisions available via WestLaw as of February 16, 
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mine the particular type of written description rejection at issue and to de-
termine whether a doctrinal change in the written description requirement 
would have impacted the outcome of the appeal.70  See Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Doctrinal Change Classification Methodology. 
 
Potential Doctrinal Change Classification Methodology 
Doctrinal Change 1: elimina-
tion of a separate written de-
scription requirement, 
including elimination of the 
USPTO‘s ability to reject 
claims that include ―new mat-
ter.‖  
Decisions were classified as being im-
pacted by Doctrinal Change 1 if the de-
cision included a written description 
requirement issue that was sustained on 
appeal for at least one claim, and no oth-
er rejections of that claim were sustained 
on appeal.71 
Doctrinal Change 2: elimina-
tion of a separate written de-
scription requirement except 
that the USPTO may still re-
ject claims for the inclusion 
of new matter. 
Decisions were classified as being im-
pacted by Doctrinal Change 2 if the de-
cision included a written description 
requirement issue that was sustained on 
appeal for at least one original claim, 
and no other rejections of that claim 
were sustained on appeal.72 
B. Study Outcomes 
Written description issues were decided in 123 (4.3%) of the 2,858 de-
cisions.73  A written description requirement rejection was sustained in 50 
(1.7%) of the decisions,74 but was outcome-determinative in only 23 (0.8%) 
of the decisions.75  All twenty-three of these outcome-determinative deci-
                                                                                                                           
2010. 
70
  To be clear, I only considered cases where claims were rejected under the written description re-
quirement.  There are two other contexts where written description issues regularly arise.  First, written 
description is applied in the prior art context to limit the prior art that is asserted.  Second, an applicant‘s 
attempt to assert rights back to a parent filing, for instance under 35 U.S.C. § 120, is limited by the writ-
ten description of the parent filing. 
71
  We coded new reasons for rejection raised by the BPAI as sustained on appeal. 
72
  For this study, a claim is considered ―original‖ if the claim was included in the original non-
provisional application filing.  When the appeal involves a continuation application, a claim is ―original‖ 
only if the language was found in the original non-provisional parent application.  A patent applicant is 
allowed to amend claims during prosecution.  However, written description requirement rejections of 
amended claims are typically treated under the new matter wing of the doctrine.  See supra text accom-
panying notes 2932. 
73
  As a point of reference, a recent study found that 90% of appeals included at least one obvious-
ness issue that was decided on appeal.  Dennis D. Crouch, Understanding the Role of the Board of Pa-
tent Appeals: Ex Parte Rejection Rates on Appeal 10 (Univ. of Mo. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research 
Paper No. 2009-16, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1423922 (link). 
74
  A rejection was considered sustained if a rejection of at least one claim was sustained. 
75
  The written description issue was judged outcome-determinative if the decision included a writ-
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sions involved the rejection of claims that had been added or amended dur-
ing prosecution and addressed the concern that the added limitations were 
not properly described in the original specification.  More pointedly, none 
of the outcomes of those decisions would have been impacted by a hypo-
thetical change that eliminated the written description requirement, so long 
as new matter rejections were still allowed under the same standard availa-
ble today.  These impacts of a doctrinal change in the written description 
requirement are shown in Table 2, with a 95% confidence interval (CI) of 
the expected proportion of affected cases.76 
 
Table 2: Retrospective Impact of Doctrinal Change on 2009 BPAI Ap-
peal Decisions. 
 






Doctrinal Change 1: elimination of a separate writ-
ten description requirement including elimination of 
the USPTO‘s ability to reject claims that include 
new matter. 
23 (0.8%) 0.5% 
-1.2% 
Doctrinal Change 2: elimination of a separate writ-
ten description requirement except that the USPTO 
may still reject claims for the inclusion of new mat-
ter. 
0 (0.00%) 0.0% 
-0.3% 
 
Twelve of the BPAI decisions did involve written description require-
ment rejections based on originally-filed claim language that could be clas-
sified as LWD rejections.  However, the written description requirement 
was not outcome-determinative in any of these cases because the examin-
er‘s rejection was either reversed (nine of the cases) or else the claims were 
also rejected under another statutory doctrine (three of the cases).  The three 
decisions where the LWD written description rejection was affirmed all in-
volved inventions related to chemistry77 or biotechnology.78  This is the 
same situation discussed in the Federal Circuit case of In re Kubin.79  Table 
                                                                                                                           
ten description requirement issue that was sustained on appeal for at least one claim and if no other re-
jections of that claim were sustained on appeal. 
76
  The outcomes are modeled with the Poisson distribution. 
77
  Ex parte Hottovy, No. 2008-4938, 2009 WL 798882 (B.P.A.I. 2009) (polymerization of olefin 
monomers in a liquid diluent); Ex parte Harboe, No. 2008-5837, 2009 WL 1683026 (B.P.A.I. 2009) (re-
ducing the glucoamylase activity in a milk clotting composition). 
78
  Ex parte Carney, No. 2008-4806, 2009 WL 64628 (B.P.A.I. 2009) (stimulating cartilage growth 
by administering an agonist of an activated thrombin receptor).  In his 2007 study, Holman found nine 
BPAI decisions affirming LWD rejectionsall in the area of biotechnology.  Holman, supra note 17, at 
70. 
79
  In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (affirming obviousness rejection and not de-
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3 shows written description issues grouped by the USPTO technology cen-
ter of origin.  As shown in the table, the chemistry and biotechnology re-
lated technology centers are associated with a greater prevalence of written 
description issues.80  However, even in those areas, the outcome-
determinative written description issues were always associated with the 
new matter wing of the requirement. 
 
























202 23 (11.4%) 2 (1.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
1700 Chemical and  
Materials 
Engineering 








479 16 (3.3%) 3 (0.6%) 0 (0.0%) 




333 8 (2.4%) 1 (0.3%) 0 (0.0%) 
                                                                                                                           
ciding question of written description) (link); see also Ex parte Kubin, 83 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1410 
(B.P.A.I. 2007) (affirming obviousness and written description rejection but reversing enablement rejec-
tion) (link). 
80
  See Dan L. Burk, Biotechnology in the Federal Circuit: A Clockwork Lemon, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 
441 (2004) (link). 
81
  The total number of BPAI decisions categorized in this table is slightly less than the 2,858 re-
viewed decisions because some of the decisions did not indicate a technology center in the header in-
formation.  If all of the decisions had been properly categorized, the reported percentages would drop 
slightly. 
82
  This refers to the number of BPAI decisions that decided a written description requirement issue. 



























456 21 (4.6%) 1 (0.2%) 0 (0.0%) 
3900 Reexaminations 39 4 (10.3%) 2 (5.1%) 0 (0.0%) 
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
None of the 2,858 BPAI decisions that I analyzed sustained an out-
come-determinative written description requirement rejection of originally-
filed claims.  This result indicates that Chief Judge Michel‘s perspective is 
correct, that—apart from new matter and late-claiming issues—the USPTO 
actually relies on the written description requirement to support examiner 
rejection in only a miniscule number of cases (at least at the level of ap-
peals).83  Although not an exact reflection, the BPAI appeals numbers likely 
serve as a good proxy for the proportion of non-appealed prosecution files 
where the USPTO depends upon the written description requirement to lim-
it claim scope.84 





  See supra text accompanying note 66, for a discussion of why new matter claim rejections will 
still be viable even if the separate written description requirement is eliminated. 
84
  Although not conclusive, several factors suggest that written description rejections may be ap-
pealed at a greater rate than ordinary obviousness rejections.  First, an accurate practitioner perception 
that BPAI appeals of written description requirement rejections have a higher-than-average reversal rate 
could lead to a larger proportion of those types of rejections appealed.  Crouch, supra note 73.  Second, 
the recent tumultuous nature of the written description requirement and the associated uncertainty adds 
to the likelihood that a rejection on that issue would be appealed.  Finally, written description rejec-
tionsespecially those relating to LWDtend to arise from biotechnology and chemical-related patent 
applications.  Because patents in those areas tend to be more valuable than average, we would expect a 
higher rate of appeal. 
As a cross-check, I examined the file histories of a small group of randomly selected and publicly 
available patent applications with serial numbers 11/000,000–11/999,999.  For each application, I 
looked at the most recent final office action (if any) to determine the reasons for rejection.  Only one of 
the twenty final office actions in my sample included a written description rejection, and that rejection 
was based on subject matter that had changed due to an amendment during prosecution. 
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any questions about the proper role of the written description requirement 
during litigation.  Likewise, this study is not intended to either indict or 
support the potential use of the written description requirement during pa-
tent examination.  Rather, the study is directed only toward rebutting the 
USPTO‘s statements that the written description requirement is necessary 
for the agency to perform its examination function.  Based on the results 
presented here, it is safe to treat the USPTO‘s statements of the doctrine‘s 
importance as incorrect.  The Ariad court was correct in its rejection of this 
argument. 
